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Opening Address
Equality and Freedom of Speech
TERRANCE SANDALOW'
The editors responsible for today's symposium have posed an
alarming question: whether we are witnessing the demise of the First
Amendment. I want to dispel at the outset any anxiety the question
may have aroused. The First Amendment is alive and well; indeed,
it is thriving. I believe, though I cannot prove, that public respect
for the values it expresses has never been greater than it has been in
recent years. Whether or not I am correct in that belief, however, it
is certain that constitutional protections against governmental efforts
to limit speech and other forms of expressive activity are greater today
than ever before in our history.
The importance of the wide range of freedoms we now associate
with the First Amendment is so deeply embedded in the contemporary
American psyche that many forget that the establishment of those
freedoms is almost entirely the work of the twentieth century. At the
beginning of the century, even Justice Holmes-who is now regarded
as the modern father (or perhaps grandfather) of contemporary First
Amendment jurisprudence-opined that the First Amendment pro-
hibited only prior restraints, a concept that he understood much more
narrowly than courts now do. 2 Four score and seven years later, the
range of speech and conduct protected by the First Amendment is so
vast that it defies description in the time available. A few illustrations,
selected mainly to convey a sense of the breadth of the amendment's
current reach, will, therefore, have to suffice. As currently interpreted,
the First Amendment protects the publication and exhibition of most
sexually explicit material, including topless and bottomless dancing,3
and significantly limits governmental authority to award a remedy to
individuals who have been defamed. 4 It substantially restricts legis-
lative power to control the financing of political campaigns5 and, with
1. Edson R. Sunderland Professor of Law, The University of Michigan.
2. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
3. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 661 (1981); Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
4. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times, Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); Federal
Election Comm'n v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976).
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limited exceptions, denies government the power to hire and fire
employees on the basis of their political affiliations. 6 The amendment
confers broad protection for commercial speech, 7 denies government
the authority to prohibit desecration of the American flag,8 and
prevents government from punishing the advocacy of violence and
other illegal acts unless the advocacy is "directed to inciting ...
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite . . . such action." 9 And
in addition to creating broad areas of protected speech, the Court
has stacked an armory with an array of weapons-e.g., the doctrines
of vagueness, overbreadth, and content neutrality-that the judiciary
can employ when it concludes that government has gone too far in
attempting to control communicative activities. 10
These restrictions on governmental authority, and many others
that might be mentioned, were virtually unthinkable until relatively
recently. The Supreme Court's use of the First Amendment to restrict
governmental authority over communicative activities began and then
developed slowly during the 1930s, gathered significant steam during
the decade of the 1940s, slowed and perhaps even suffered some
setbacks during the 1950s, and then exploded during the constitutional
revolution of the 1960s. Had a person of my generation, one who
had come to constitutional awareness during the 1950s, been able to
foresee the increasingly "conservative" cast of the Court over the
quarter century following Chief Justice Warren's retirement-i.e.,
from 1969 to the present-he might well have predicted that one
result would be a significant retrenchment in constitutional protection
for communicative activities. In fact, no such retrenchment has oc-
curred. To the contrary, the range of such activities to receive judicial
protection under the First Amendment was significantly enlarged over
that period. The extension of protection to commercial speech and
the repudiation of the "spoils" system, to take but two examples,
did not occur until the mid-1970s. Yet another example of the con-
tinuing expansion of First Amendment freedoms is provided by the
justices' attitudes toward flag desecration. As recently as 1969, Chief
6. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Branti v. Finkel,
445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
7. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993);
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557
(1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
8. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
9. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see also NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
10. See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 785-1061 (2d ed.,
1988).
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Justice Warren and Justices Black and Fortas, three "liberal" mem-
bers of the Court who in their time were especially sympathetic to
First Amendment claims, thought that the First Amendment did not
require reversal of a conviction for flag-burning under a statute that
made it a misdemeanor "to publicly mutilate, deface, defile, or defy,
trample upon,or cast contempt upon" the flag of the United States."
Two decades later, the Court held otherwise, a decision joined by
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, two of its most "conservative" mem-
bers. 12 The contrast between these votes speaks volumes about the
shift in the center of gravity of the Court's free speech jurisprudence.
I am, for these reasons, entirely confident in offering a negative
answer to the editors' question and in asserting that the First Amend-
ment's vital signs are very strong.
But to maintain that the First Amendment is alive and well is
not to deny that significant issues about its reach remain to be
resolved, among them those that are the subject of today's sympo-
sium. Merely to recognize the latter as issues, and thereby to see them
as still open to discussion, will seem to some to mark a retreat from
established First Amendment principles. It is, I think, more useful to
recognize that contemporary controversy over those issues is intrinsic
to the process by which the meaning of the First Amendment evolves.
"Freedom of speech" is not a concept of invariant meaning. It
does not mean today what it meant in the 1950s, and neither now
nor then does it mean what it meant in 1791. As the years go by,
circumstances change and, as they change, new issues emerge and old
issues are seen in a new light. The consequences of protecting or
failing to protect certain kinds of communication may now be un-
derstood to be very different from what they were once thought to
be. Legal protection of certain expressive activities may, in some
circumstances, be thought to collide with other values that now seem
more important than they did at an earlier time. Values that at one
time seemed harmonious may now seem to diverge. In such circum-
stances, we-or at least those responsible for fashioning our law-
cannot avoid the necessity of choice. We can, of course, pretend that
we have no choice, that principles articulated at an earlier time-
principles formulated in response to issues very different from those
we now confront-are somehow dispositive of the latter. But the
consequence of indulging in that pretense is to assure that the issues
will not be intelligently resolved. To be sure, the resulting decision
11. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 578 (1969). A majority of the Court, in an
opinion by Justice Harlan, avoided the question, holding that Street's conviction could not be
sustained because it depended upon the words he had spoken while burning the flag. Id.
12. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
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may nonetheless be desirable, but if it is, that will be purely a matter
of chance, for neither we nor our predecessors will have made a
decision with an adequate appreciation of what is at stake.
I do not mean to suggest that the past is irrelevant in making
the choices we now confront. My point, rather, is that principles and
doctrines formulated at an earlier time are not a set of blinders
designed to shield us from knowledge of current circumstances and
the issues they present. They are, however, materials that, carefully
employed, can assist in reaching a wise-decision. An understanding
of the past-of the principles and doctrines fashioned to give content
to constitutional concepts and of the circumstances to which they
were addressed-is a resource upon which to draw in thinking our
way through the issues we currently face. As we explore the past,
seeking to understand the reasons advanced in support of principles
formulated at an earlier time and the similarities and differences
between that time and our own, we are likely to see more clearly and
evaluate more wisely the choices we now confront. Still, however
useful an understanding of the past may be in clarifying those choices,
it cannot dictate our response to them. That prerogative-and the
responsibility that goes with it-belongs to the present. 3
The topics to be addressed in the two panel discussions scheduled
for today are facets of a more general issue that illustrates my point.
During the past decade or so, the argument has increasingly been
heard that some speech threatens realization of our national commit-
ment to the ideal of equality and should, therefore, be prohibited.
Thus, a growing number of legal scholars, led by my colleague
Catharine MacKinnon, urge that pornography-defined as sexually
explicit words or pictures that depict women as sexually subservient
objects-should be forbidden.' 4 Their claim is that by sexualizing male
dominance pornography contributes to the denial of equality to women.
So too, many colleges and universities have adopted codes prohibiting
speech that creates a "hostile environment" for the members of
certain groups.15 Similarly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as interpreted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
imposes sanctions on employers that fail to prevent their employees
from engaging in such speech.16 Speech of that kind, it is said,
13. See generally Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV.
1033, 1068-72 (1981).
14. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 261-70 (1993).
15. See Preliminary Report on Freedom of Expression and Campus Harassment Codes,
77 ACADEME 23 (May-June, 1991).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2002 et seq.; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
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discriminates against the members of these groups, depriving them of
their right to equal treatment as students and employees. Less obvi-
ously, current controversy over demonstrations at abortion clinics also
arises out of a perceived conflict between a claim resting on the idea
of equality and a claimed right of free expression. The demonstrators'
arguments are not significantly different from the claims made by
civil rights demonstrators a generation ago. But whereas the latter
demonstrated to achieve equality, it is now the targets of the dem-
onstrations who ground their claims in the ideal of equality, arguing
that the freedom of women to obtain abortions is an essential con-
dition for achieving gender equality.17
The assertion that in these instances equality trumps freedom of
speech is a function of the increasing salience and weight of the
former as an ideal. Equality has, of course, been a prominent theme
throughout American history, 8 but during the past several decades,
beginning with the civil rights movement, claims resting on the ideal
of equality have been especially prominent. As various groups-
blacks, various ethnic groups, women, gays, and others-strive to
achieve the benefits of full participation in American life, the moral
claim they assert has most frequently been cast not in terms of freedom
or welfare or other values that might have been invoked, but in terms
of equality. Traditional practices, established norms of behavior, and
deeply held values have all been challenged in the name of equality.
Social institutions and practices as different from one another as the
traditional family and academic admission and grading standards have
come under attack as impediments to realization of the ideal.
Perhaps in these circumstances it should occasion no surprise
that embedded ideas about freedom of speech should also be ques-
tioned in the name of equality. Still, it does occasion surprise that
those who claim to speak on behalf of groups alleged to be among
society's oppressed should seek to invoke governmental power to limit
speech. Historically, such groups have not sought to invoke govern-
mental power to suppress speech, but to limit that power. Govern-
mental suppression of speech has been a means by which those who
hold power have attempted to maintain it against those who seek
social change or to suppress those who are merely different. As the
late Harry Kalven once wrote, we owe much of the modern history
of the First Amendment to Jehovah's Witnesses, Communists, and
17. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 114 S. Ct.
909 (1994); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1185, 1198-
1209 (1992).
18. See, e.g., MEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, Vol. II (Reeve ed.
1945).
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Negroes,19 groups no one would have counted among society's pow-
erful at the time they struggled to expand the reach of the First
Amendment. A generous conception of freedom of speech has played
so significant a role in the efforts of the disenfranchised to achieve
equality that one would suppose that those who claim to speak on
their behalf would be especially loathe to narrow the reach of the
concept. Yet, as today's symposium demonstrates, the opposite seems
to be the case.
A cynic might conclude that, as is so often the case, it's all a
question of whose ox is being gored. Or, as Nat Hentoff put it in
the title of his recent book, Free Speech For Me But Not For Thee.20
I have no doubt that there is some truth in the cynic's response.
Those who now seek to limit speech in the name of equality would
hardly be the first to reconsider principles they once held dear when
those principles begin to cut against their interests. In the end, how-
ever, the cynic's response is not an entirely satisfactory one, for it
fails to consider whether speech of the kind that its critics now seek
to suppress in the name of equality is different from the speech that
heretofore has been held to be constitutionally protected.
The central insight of those who urge that some limitations should
be placed upon speech that threatens equality is that private power
may be as oppressive as governmental power. Limitations upon speech
that threatens equality are, therefore, not to be judged in the same
way as limitations aimed at achieving equality because the former
merely reinforce private power, while the latter act as a countervailing
force to it. One may or may not be persuaded by that argument, but
I do not see how it can be ignored. It does point to an arguable
difference between traditional free speech claims and those that are
currently being made against efforts to limit speech that threatens
equality. The reality and significance of the asserted difference are
questions that must be addressed in any serious effort to confront
the claims made by those who propose to restrict speech in the service
of equality.
Those questions are among the issues posed in two different
contexts by the panel discussions that follow. The civil rights move-
ment and the Vietnam protests taught us that street demonstrations
are an important means of communication that, despite the dangers
they pose, are worthy of constitutional protection. Are demonstrations
at abortion clinics different in a way that justifies their suppression
or, if they are not different, have we learned from them that we
19. HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 173-75 (1965).
20. NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME BUT NOT FOR THEE (1992).
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should reconsider the extent to which demonstrations should be con-
stitutionally protected? If anti-abortion demonstrations are constitu-
tionally protected in at least some circumstances, as they surely are,2
does the use of RICO against demonstrators who employ violence
threaten to chill constitutionally protected demonstrations? Last Term,
in National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Schiedler, the Supreme
Court recognized that question, but declined to decide it because the
issue had not been properly presented. 22 The question is properly
presented here and will be addressed later this morning.
In the afternoon, we turn to another aspect of the current tension
between equality and freedom of speech, the prosecution of so-called
"hate crimes." Our legal tradition does not permit the prosecution
of individuals for their beliefs. Is legislation of the kind sustained in
Wisconsin v. Mitchell,23 legislation that provides for enhanced sen-
tences when criminal acts are motivated by prejudice against the
members of certain groups consistent with that principle? Does the
fact that enhanced sentences are imposed only when criminal acts are
motivated by certain beliefs-say, anti-Semitism-constitute imper-
missible content or even viewpoint discrimination? What evidence
may be introduced to prove that the defendant was motivated by
prejudice? For example, may the government introduce evidence that
a defendant convicted of assault is (or was at one time) a member of
the Aryan Brotherhood or of the Nation of Islam, or would the
introduction of such evidence effectively penalize the defendant for
the exercise of First Amendment freedoms?
Since these and other questions about RICO and "hate crimes"
legislation are to be fully addressed by the panelists, I want to consider
very briefly the current tension between equality and freedom of
speech in another context in which controversy has arisen, the adop-
tion of harassment codes by colleges and universities. Over the past
decade, scores, perhaps hundreds, of colleges and universities, in-
cluding many public institutions, have adopted so-called harassment
codes aimed at protecting members of groups defined in terms of
race, ethnic origin, sex, sexual preference and at times other charac-
teristics. To the extent that the codes are directed at harassing con-
duct-e.g., physical assault, vandalism, or stalking-the codes are
unproblematic. The only conceivable objection to them is that similar
conduct, differently motivated, is treated differently, and perhaps less
severely, thereby revealing that the institution is really attempting to
21. Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
22. NOW v. Schiedler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 806 n.6 (1994).
23. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
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suppress certain beliefs. But that objection appears to be foreclosed,
at least for the time being, by the Supreme Court's decision in
Wisconsin v. Mitchell.24 A state might reasonably conclude, the Court
said, that "bias-inspired conduct" should be punished more severely
because such conduct is "thought to inflict greater individual and
societal harm" than similar conduct differently motivated.-5 "Bias
motivated crimes" it reasoned, may well be "more likely to provoke
retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims,
and incite community unrest. "26
The proscription of such conduct by harassment codes is relatively
uncontroversial, but many of the codes reach beyond conduct in an
effort to protect the members of certain groups from speech that
denigrates those groups and thereby contributes to creating or main-
taining an environment hostile to their members. Speech of that kind,
it is argued, inflicts emotional injury on the members of the protected
groups and, in doing so, denies them equal opportunity to benefit
from institutional programs. The idea that behavior that creates a
hostile environment for members of protected groups should be pro-
scribed because it discriminates against them draws support from
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,27 in which the Supreme Court held
that the ban on sex discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196428 extends to conduct that creates a hostile working
environment for female employees. 29 Following that decision, a num-
ber of educational institutions promulgated regulations that rest upon
the same idea. The University of Michigan, for example, adopted a
code that subjected students and employees to discipline for, inter
alia,
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes
an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status,
handicap, or Vietnam-era veteran status, and that . . .
b. has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering
with an individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in
University-sponsored extra-curricular activities . . . or
c. creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment
for educational pursuits, employment, or participation in University
sponsored extra-curricular activities .1
24. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
25. Id. at 2201.
26. Id.
27. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
29. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.
30. See Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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This language tracked that of Guidelines adopted by the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission and approved by the Supreme
Court in Meritor.3' But Meritor did not involve behavior arguably
protected by the First Amendment and, not surprisingly, the Court
did not even mention, much less consider, the tension between the
guidelines and the First Amendment when the hostile environment is
created by speech or other forms of communicative activity. In an
academic setting, however, issues arising out of that tension were
bound to arise fairly quickly. And, of course, they did.
The Michigan experience is illuminating. A student in a graduate
social work class stated his view that homosexuality is a disease and
went on to describe how, as a therapist, he would treat the disease.
The student was prosecuted for violating the harassment code.32 At
about the same time, the University distributed to all students and
employees two pamphlets explaining the code and providing examples
of forbidden conduct and speech. An opponent of the code intent
upon demonstrating its potential for restricting constitutionally pro-
tected speech could not have posited a more convincing "parade of
horribles." Among the examples of forbidden speech were a statement
that "women just aren't as good in this field as men" and "jokes
about gay men and lesbians." 33 It requires no great stretch of the
imagination to think of other, equally troublesome applications of
the code. Thus, the language of the code seems broad enough to
cover the following hypothetical, but hardly very improbable, case:
Following a ceremony honoring Vietnam veterans, a middle-aged
faculty member who as a student had demonstrated against the Viet-
nam war makes a speech in which he states that those who fought in
the war were not heroes, but murderers. Like the statements the
University regarded as prohibited by the code, that speech stigmatizes
the members of a protected class and thereby creates an "intimidating,
hostile, or demeaning environment" for them, and thus has the
"reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with an individual's
academic efforts, employment, or participation in ... extra-curricular
activities.' '34
These and myriad other actual or hypothetical situations sharply
present the conflict between equality and freedom of speech. The
potentially wounding effect of hearing it said that one's sexual ori-
31. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
32. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 854.
33. Id. at 857-58.
34. Indeed, the pamphlet explicitly informed readers that "you are a harasser when
'[y]ou comment in a derogatory way about a particular person or group's physical appearance
or sexual orientation, or their cultural origins, or religious beliefs."' Id. at 858.
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entation is a disease, that members of one's sex are less capable than
others of pursuing the profession one has chosen, or that one is
regarded as a murderer seems to me beyond doubt. Nor do I doubt
that the psychic injury that results from such statements will interfere
with the ability of some to benefit from the institution's programs.
Statements like these do not, after all, stand alone. They occur within
an environment in which the views reflected in the statements are
likely to be sufficiently widespread that they have been heard before.
The cumulative effect of that repetition may well cause anger, self-
doubt, or other emotions likely to interfere with equal enjoyment of
the institution's programs.
At the same time, the attempt to proscribe statements that have
these effects strikes at the core of our First Amendment tradition.
The First Amendment, as it has come to be understood, represents
our national commitment to the belief that debate on issues of public
policy should be, as Justice Brennan wrote in New York Times, Co.
v. Sullivan, "uninhibited, robust and wide-open."" Codes like Mi-
chigan's can be upheld only if that commitment does not extend to
certain subjects, if those subjects or certain views about them can be
put beyond the bounds of lawful discussion. The range of subjects
on which "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" discussion would no
longer be permissible is potentially very large, for much that may be
said may well be understood to create a hostile environment for
members of one or another protected class. Ridicule of the Roman
Catholic Church's position on contraception and abortion or of fun-
damentalist Protestant belief in the literal truth of the Bible and
opposition to minority preferences in student admissions or faculty
employment on the ground that they diminish the intellectual quality
of the university are no less likely to create a hostile environment for
some members of the university community than the statements dis-
cussed previously.3 6 Nor does it require a great deal of imagination
to think of other subjects on which discussions would be restricted.
Surprising as it may seem to a contemporary student of the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court decision most closely on point sug-
gests that such statements can be prohibited. In a 1952 decision,
35. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
36. Since the codes, like the EEOC Guidelines, often do not contain an intent requirement
proponents of minority preferences may also be limited in the arguments they may present.
Thus, the argument that minority preferences are necessary because of the devastating impact
their elimination would have upon minority enrollments, see Terrance Sandalow, Minority
Preferences in Law School Admissions in CONSTITUTIONAL GovERLNMrNT IN AMERICA (R. Collins,
ed. 1980), may have no less a tendency to create a hostile environment than the argument that
the presence of minorities has an adverse effect on the intellectual quality of the institution.
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Beauharnais v. Illinois,3 7 the Court sustained, though only by a 5-4
vote, an Illinois group libel law that prohibited publication or exhi-
bition in any public place of material that "portrays depravity, crim-
inality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any
race, color, creed or religion, which . . . exposes the citizens of any
race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or oblo-
quy. ."I Although Beauharnais has never been explicitly overruled,
nearly all students of constitutional law believe that the decision does
not survive more recent interpretations of the amendment.3 9 In the
years since Beauharnais, the Supreme Court has made clear that the
expression of opinion is constitutionally protected. There are, as
Justice Powell once wrote, no false ideas under the First Amendment.
4
0
I suppose an argument might be made that the statement that women
"are not as good in this field" as men, whatever that might mean,
or that Vietnam veterans are murderers are statements of fact, not
opinion, and therefore susceptible to a demonstration of falsity.
Surely, however, that argument misconceives the import of the state-
ments. The statements are not meant to assert that no woman is "as
good" as any man in this field or that all Vietnam veterans would
be convicted if prosecuted under a statute prohibiting homicide, but
to express a judgment about the abilities of women generally or the
moral status of those who served in the Vietnam War. Moreover, it
is clear that under our law as it now stands, when issues of public
concern are involved, truth is a defense to any suit based on libel.
4 1
The need for that defense is even more compelling when government
seeks to restrict speech on such matters. Proscribing speech that tends
to create a hostile environment for members of a protected class thus
presents the distasteful prospect of litigating such questions as whether
women are as good as men in various fields, how we should regard
Vietnam veterans, or whether minority admission preferences reduce
the intellectual quality of universities. 42 But these and similar issues
are not matters for which our tradition permits the establishment of
an official truth. They are, rather, subjects of continuing public
discussion, a discussion that government may not terminate. As in-
dividuals we may dishonor those who make such statements, but they
are not statements of a kind that we trust government to forbid.
37. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
38. Id. at 251.
39. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1077 (12th ed. 1991).
40. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
41. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepp, 457 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986).
42. See Robert Post, Free Speech and Religious, Racial, and Sexual Harassment: Racist
Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 267, 290-300 (1991).
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These considerations suggest that codes like Michigan's cannot
easily be reconciled with the contemporary understanding of the First
Amendment, 43 but they do not fully meet the argument of the codes'
proponents that legislation restricting the speech of the powerful in
the service of equality should be judged differently from other res-
trictions on speech. There are, however, at least two difficulties with
that argument. First, the widespread enactment of the codes, similar
restrictions upon speech imposed by EEOC regulations, and the wide-
ranging legislative successes of the groups for whose protection the
codes were adopted demonstrates that "power," public or private, is
a far more complex concept than the argument recognizes. If women,
minorities, and homosexuals (and Vietnam veterans?) are as powerless
as the argument appears to assume, one wonders how these measures
came to be adopted.
Second, though I doubt that proponents wish to acknowledge it,
the argument appears to assume that the idea of equality and the
nation's commitment to it are beyond debate. But the meaning of
equality and its implications for social policy toward various groups
are, and for the indefinite future are certain to remain, unresolved
issues. American society has not achieved, nor is there any prospect
that it will achieve, unanimity regarding the appropriate role of women
in our society, the normality or morality of homosexuality and,
therefore, of its practitioners, and the continuing controversies over
race and ethnicity that have for so long plagued the nation. In the
course of the ongoing discussion of these matters, it is inevitable that
much will be said that is deeply offensive to-and, therefore, creates
a hostile environment for-many citizens. Especially in view of the
role of universities in our society, it would be ironic if they alone
were closed to that discussion.
A conclusion that the First Amendment does not-and should
not be read to-permit public colleges and universities to outlaw the
expression of certain ideas in the service of equality does not, however,
entail the further conclusion that they must tolerate every speech act.
Threats of violence and other forms of intimidation, even if purely
verbal, lie well beyond the amendment's protection. The amendment
should confer no greater protection on language that, when directed
to individuals, is commonly understood to be assaultive-those abu-
sive, racial, ethnic, and sexual epithets that, as the Supreme Court
once wrote of "fighting words," "by their very utterance inflict injury
43. Not surprisingly, therefore, such codes have not fared well in the courts. See, e.g.,
UWM Post, Inc., v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (1991); Doe v. University of
Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (1989).
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or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. '"" I do not mean
to suggest that the use of such epithets can or should be outlawed.
In some contexts-as when they are employed ironically, or for
instructional purposes, or even when they are employed in the course
of argument to characterize a group-such epithets may serve com-
municative purposes inextricably entwined with the idea that the
speaker intends to convey. In these situations, constitutional protec-
tion is justified by the same reasons that justify the protection of
speech generally. But when the epithets are specifically directed to
one or a small group of individuals, with the intention of degrading
or humiliating those to whom they are directed, their importance in
communicating an idea is dwarfed by their assaultive character. "[S]uch
utterances," as the Court said of "fighting words," are "no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
'45
The Court's recent decision in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul"
indicates that it may nonetheless invalidate even so limited a prohi-
bition. The defendant in that case, who together with several other
teenagers had burned a cross inside the fenced yard of a black family,
had been convicted for violating an ordinance prohibiting the place-
ment "on public or private property [of] a symbol, object, appellation
or graffiti, including ... a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which
one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender. . . ,,47 The state supreme court had interpreted the ordinance
to reach only those expressions that are "fighting words," but in a
5-4 decision the U.S. Supreme Court nevertheless held the ordinance
unconstitutional." Because the ordinance prohibited only those "fight-
ing words" based on "race, color, creed, religion, or gender," the
Court reasoned, it violated the First Amendment's ban on "content"
and "viewpoint" discrimination.
49
R.A. V. cannot, in my judgment, be persuasively reconciled with
the Court's subsequent unanimous decision in Wisconsin v. Mitchell. °
In the latter, as discussed above, the Court recognized that physical
assaults motivated by hostility to the characteristics typically specified
44. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
45. Id.
46. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
47. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
48. Id. at 2550.
49. Id. at 2547-48.
50. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
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in harassment codes may be especially harmful and, therefore, call
for distinctive treatment." Yet, it is no less true of verbal than of
physical assaults that they attack attributes of an individual that are
often central to personal identity. To the extent that the attributes
are the basis for widespread invidious discrimination the injury to the
individual is likely to be cumulative and, therefore, felt with greater
intensity. A university might, thus, reasonably conclude that, as the
Court said in Mitchell, special measures are required to deal with
such verbal assaults because they are "more likely to provoke retal-
iatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and
incite community unrest.
' '5 2
The issues raised by campus harassment codes, to put the argu-
ment somewhat differently, are too complex to be resolved by asking,
simplistically, whether free speech is more important than equality or
whether the opposite is true. Room exists, as we may hope the court
will yet come to realize, for making distinctions that take account of
context. First Amendment doctrine abounds with such distinctions
elsewhere. There is no apparent reason that it cannot do when it
confronts the current tensions between equality and freedom of speech.
51. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201.
52. Id.
